Sense of ownership is often advocated as an argument for local participation within the epistemic development and nature conservation communities. Stakeholder participation in initiating, designing or implementing institutions is claimed to establish a sense of ownership among the stakeholders and subsequently improve the intended outcomes of the given institution. Theoretical and empirical justications of the hypothesis remain scarce. A better understanding of the eects of local participation can motivate more extensive and stronger participation of local stakeholders and improve institutional performance. This paper applies theories from psychology and behavioral economics to better understand sense of ownership. The empirical investigation is a framed eld experiment, in the context of tropical forest conservation and payments for environmental services in Tanzania. The results lend little support to the hypothesis in this context. The participation treatment in the experiment is weak, and a possible explanation is that sense of ownership is sensitive to the form of participation.
Introduction
A common argument for participation of local stakeholders within the epistemic development and nature conservation communities is that participation directly improves institutions' ability to deliver eective, ecient or equitable outcomes.
1 Dubbed sense of ownership, the argument hypothesizes that local stakeholders sense ownership of institutions they are involved in initiating, designing and/or implementing. This sense of ownership subsequently increases stakeholder support and thus institutional performance. The argument is found both among project proponents 2 and in the academic literature (e.g., Lachapelle, 2008; Reed, 2008; Marks and Davis, 2012) . Schultz et al. (2011, p. 662) summarize the hypothesis as people are more likely to support and implement decisions they have participated in making, and Buchy and Hoverman (2000, p. 19) argue that people, feeling a sense of ownership, will be more compliant to bear the costs. A Google Scholar search reveals 162 articles in ten top development journals mentioning sense of ownership in the period 1990-2016. 3 Despite its popularity, the hypothesis lacks a precise denition. Details remain fuzzy on how participation induces sense of ownership and how it in turn improves institutional performance, controlling for other positive aspects of participation, such as access to local knowledge. One reason is inadequate theoretical tools. Sense implies a psychological mechanism, which is rarely explored in the relevant literature. Another reason is challenges in empirically identifying sense of ownership eects. Participation and sense of ownership as elusive concepts makes comparative studies dicult, and persistent biases in observations makes more quantitative investigations dicult. Several scholars note that research assessing the eects of stakeholder participation on institution performance is scarce (Agrawal, 2007; Reed, 2008; Schultz et al., 2011; Marks and Davis, 2012; Mansuri and Rao, 2013b) .
Viewing participation as a means, understanding sense of ownership can help initiate, design and implement more ecient, eective and equitable institutions. Viewing participation as an end, nding support for the hypothesis can motivate more and stronger participatory approaches among policy makers.
This paper applies psychology and behavioral economics for a theoretical understanding of sense of ownership, and proposes three possible drivers: biased information processing, associative self-anchoring and cognitive dissonance (Section 3). Economic experiments can help improve our empirical understanding by testing the drivers and controlling for possible confounding factors. Since sense of ownership may be context specic, a framed eld experiment tests one specic form of participation in the relevant context of forest conservation in Tanzania (Section 4). The results (Section 5) are discussed in light of participation in development and nature conservation institutions (Section 6), before the conclusion (Section 7). To explore the participation-sense of ownership link, the following section presents a typology of participation.
Participation

Denitions and classications
Over the last 40 years, participation has become a core element in the implementation of development and nature conservation institutions in developing countries (Cohen and Upho, 1980; Cornwall, 2008; Lie, 2015) . Major actors emphasize local participation and partnerships as important factors in their work. For instance, the World Bank spent an estimated USD 85 billion on local participatory projects during the last decade alone (Mansuri and Rao, 2013b) .
Despite the long focus on and the positive aspects of participatory approaches, empirical investigations often nd implementations to be questionable. In some cases participation is more a buzzword in project 1 The paper uses the term institution in the understanding of North (1990) as rules that dene and/or constrain human interaction. Section 4 presents the institution for empirical investigation.
2 For instance, [...] broad ownership of a decision makes it more likely that implementation will be supported by a range of stakeholders (Richards et al., 2004, p. 11); reating a sense of ownership is essential to building and sustaining productive TB [Tuberculosis] partnerships (CDC, 2007) ; Ownership is an inherently appealing concept. In plain language, people should be involved in determining their own destiny, and if they are, they are more likely to support management eorts designed to move in this direction (Manning and Ginger, 2007, p. 190) ; [p] romoting participation helps build ownerhsip [sic] and enhances transparency and accountability, and in doing so enhances eectiveness of development projects and policies (World Bank, 2015) . Review (11); Sustainable Development (7); Environment and Development Economics (6); Oxford Development Studies (4) [August 8, 2016] . documents than reality (Baland and Platteau, 1996; Cornwall and Brock, 2005; Alejandro Leal, 2007; Reed, 2008; Ribot et al., 2010; Green and Lund, 2015; Lie, 2015) . Another reason for varying practice is that participation is subject to a range of denitions, depending on context and objective (Lawrence, 2006; Cornwall, 2008) . This paper views participation as the process where stakeholders make choices that determine (or co-determine) institutions. Stakeholders are local individuals who are aected by the institution and the choices (Freeman, 1984; Reed, 2008) . I focus on the local level and not societal wide participation, such as devolution and decentralization processes (cf. Agrawal and Ostrom, 2001 ).
There are numerous classications of participation. I focus on two dimensions: degree of involvement and timing. The ladder of Arnstein (1969) Stakeholders may be involved at dierent time stages. First, the initiative can arise from the stakeholders or from the outside. Mansuri and Rao (2013a) distinguish between organic participation, where social movements from below initiate the process, and induced participation, where the initiative is external (but stakeholders are later involved within the set agenda). Second, stakeholders may participate in designing the institution (i.e., setting the rules). Third, stakeholders can participate in implementing the initiative made in stage one according to the design formed in stage two. The time and involvement dimensions with three stages/degrees each thus create nine cells, as presented in Figure 1 .
While these categories are not exhaustive and demarcations blur, such a typology can be useful to understand participation as a means. It particularly allows for applying theories from behavioral economics to explain possible positive eects of participation.
Why participation may matter
From a project proponent's perspective, participation of local stakeholders can be a means to improve an institution's eectiveness (achievement of the set objectives), eciency (costs of achieving the objectives) and/or equity (fair distribution of costs and benets). Institutional performance refers to the ability to deliver these three es according to given objectives. This instrumental signicance of participation is advocated in many settings, e.g., in organizations (Pierce et al., 2001) , in medicine (Hickey and Kipping, 1998) and in marketing (Krugman, 1966) .
Related to development and nature conservation institutions, a study of irrigation projects in South India found farmers to be more likely to help maintain eld-channels if they had been involved in designing the maintenance plans (Bardhan, 2000) . In Belize, local involvement in planning and implementing sanitation projects has led to better maintained school toilets years later (Chatterley et al., 2013) . And Buchy and Hoverman (2000, p. 16) argue for participation as a management tool in Australian forestry.
Tanzania's participatory forest management (PFM) has arguably been somewhat successful in reaching its goal of sustainable forest use (Brockington, 2007; Lund and Treue, 2008; Blomley and Iddi, 2009; Treue et al., 2014) . Mansuri and Rao (2013b, p. 6) , in their extensive review of the relevant literature, conclude that greater community involvement seems to modestly improve resource sustainability and infrastructure quality, but that the benets are unequally distributed.
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The eects of participation have also been explored in laboratory experiments. In public good experiments, participants have been shown to be more likely to follow norm behavior under a sanctioning mechanism when the mechanism is chosen through a referendum than when it is imposed externally (Tyran and Feld, 2006; Sutter et al., 2010; Markussen et al., 2013 ). Dal Bó et al. (2010 aim investigate sense of ownership, which they refer to as the endogeneity premium eect. In their lab experiment, participants vote on their preferred policy in prisoners' dilemma experiments, but some groups still have the policy imposed randomly. By comparing those who voted for the policies in the group that chose the policy and in the group that had the policy imposed, they control for unobservables determining selection. They nd a positive eect of choice, and that the eect is both due to the selection eect and a mere eect of the choice. A potential issue with the design is the comparison between participants 4 Possible negative eects of local participation are not discussed (cf. Baland and Platteau, 1996; Cooke and Kothari, 2001; Brockington, 2007; Lund and Saito-Jensen, 2013) . who vote and subsequently choose a policy and participants who vote, but whose vote is disregarded and the policy (they voted for) is implemented exogenously. Participants in the latter group not only have the policy imposed, they are overruled (although with the policy they voted for). Overruling might for instance reduce the policy's credibility and thus the ability to coordinate behavior. These studies are also in abstract form and conducted in laboratories, ignoring possible context-relevant eects (Henrich et al., 2001; Harrison et al., 2007; Maddux et al., 2010; Voors et al., 2012; Handberg and Angelsen, 2015) . (Ostrom, 1990; Chambers, 1994; Pretty, 1995; Rodrik, 2000; Dietz et al., 2003; Reed, 2008; Schultz et al., 2011) Empowerment Stakeholders are better equipped (Bamberger, 1991; Buchy and Hoverman, 2000) Transparency & accountability Improves governance (Ribot, 2008; Schultz et al., 2011) Dialogue Facilitating dialogue reduces conicts (Innes, 1996; Conley and Moote, 2003) Sense of ownership Stakeholder support increases through involvement (Buchy and Hoverman, 2000; Reed, 2008; Dal Bó et al., 2010; Schultz et al., 2011; Marks and Davis, 2012) Second, the process of including local stakeholders is empowering, which helps to better sustain the institution (as stakeholders are better equipped with skills, power, knowledge, etc.). Third, as participation requires some degree of openness in the decision making process it improves the transparency and holds the project proponents more accountable, which help create more ecient institutions. Fourth, dialogues between stakeholders and project proponents, and among stakeholders, reduce the number and intensity of conicts, and thus reduce the costs related to solving such conicts. Fifth, local participation induces sense of ownership among the stakeholders, as described in Section 1. 3. Sense of ownership -a behavioral perspective
A typology
Following Section 2, stakeholders making choices with consequences is integral to (strong) participation. Both consent and control (Figure 1 ), involve stakeholders who make choices that impact the initiative, design and/or implementation of the institution. Sense of ownership entails both choice inducing ownership, and ownership improving institutional performance. Both are psychological eects, and the following attempts to nd a theoretical justication in the related literature.
The hypothesis does not normally refer to legal ownership of physical objects. A useful distinction is between real ownership and symbolic ownership (Etzioni, 1991) . The former applies strictly to objects, it involves scarcity and it often relates to legal property rights; two parties cannot own an object unless they split the property right. The latter form of ownership mostly refers to non-objects, which can be owned by multiple parties simultaneously. 
The endowment eect
The endowment eect is a well-established eect within economics and psychology; ceteris paribus, we tend to value an object more when we possess it (Kahneman et al., 1991) . The seminal experiment is that participants value coee mugs higher if endowed with them than if not (Thaler, 1980) . Not limited to concrete objects, discrepancies in people's willingness to accept (WTA) and willingness to pay (WTP) have been found for more abstract goods, such as clean air, bitter-unpleasant taste experiences, local tree density, job health risk and work eort (Horowitz and Mcconnell, 2002; Norton et al., 2012) .
The cause for the endowment eect is less certain than its presence. Morewedge and Giblin (2015) summarize the literature in six possible (not necessarily mutually exclusive) drivers. First, loss aversion:
as losses loom larger than gains, the cost of departing with a good is higher than the benet of acquiring the same good (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; K®szegi and Rabin, 2006) . Second, evolutionary advantage: the endowment eect improves one's bargaining position, thus favoring individuals with stronger endowment eect preferences (Huck et al., 2005) . Third, method driven: in a bargaining situation sellers have an incentive to increase stated WTA and buyers have an incentive to decrease stated WTP (Plott and Zeiler, 2007) . Fourth, reference prices: one adjusts WTA/WTP to the (fair) reference price, e.g., the market price for the given good (Weaver and Frederick, 2012) . Fifth, biased information processing:
sellers weigh or notice attributes of the good in question more strongly than buyers do (Carmon and Ariely, 2000) . Sixth, psychological ownership: mere (imagining to be) owning a good, independent of being seller or buyer, increases one's valuation of the good (Brehm, 1956; Symons and Johnson, 1997; Gawronski et al., 2007; Morewedge et al., 2009) . Two possible explanations of psychological ownership is associative self-anchoring (Belk, 1988; Gawronski et al., 2007; Weiss and Johar, 2013) and cognitive dissonance (Brehm, 1956 ). These two explanations are elaborated below.
Owning and choosing
The endowment eect relates to choosing. One tends to value what one chooses (e.g., to own) more than what one chooses away, also when controlling for the confounding factor that we choose what we value highest (Brehm, 1956; Johansson et al., 2005; Gawronski et al., 2007; Morewedge et al., 2009 ).
Examples include horse bettors whose condence to win on a given horse increases after placing their bet (Knox and Inkster, 1968; Akerlof and Dickens, 1982) , experiment participants who implicitly value pictures as being more attractive after having chosen to keep them than before their choice was made (Gawronski et al., 2007) , and students who value an additional mug more than the rst mug (controlling for complementarities and diminishing marginal utility) (Morewedge et al., 2009 ).
Of the six potential causes summarized above, biased information processing and psychological ownership, in the form of associative self-anchoring or cognitive dissonance, are relevant in the context of choosing symbolic ownership. The remaining causes relate to losing or giving up what is chosen, which is not applicable to choice in local participation. The following discusses biased information processing, associative self-anchoring and cognitive dissonance in more detail.
Biased information processing: According to this theory, owners are in another framing than non-owners and thus weigh attributes of the good in question dierently. This dierence in weighting is biased towards considering the good more favorable when owned. For instance, ticket-owners of an upcoming basketball game consider more the importance of the game and the desirability of attending it than non-owners, who tend to consider the list price and other costs of attending (Carmon and Ariely, 2000) . A similar tendency has been found among the well-researched coee mug owners (Johnson et al., 2007) . Related to sense of ownership in interventions, stakeholders who participate in design and implementation become owners and thus focus more on the positive aspects of the given institution than non-owners do. This favorable evaluation by the participants then leads to more support for the given institution.
Associative self-anchoring: This alternative explanation focuses on the association between oneself and the goods one chooses. Because one associates oneself with the goods one owns, and as one in general evaluates oneself positively (or wants to do so, Benabou and Tirole, 2002) , one values the goods one owns more favorably (Belk, 1988; Gawronski et al., 2007; Weiss and Johar, 2013) . That we tend to implicitly self-evaluate ourselves positively implies that we non-consciously think of our self-concept and self-esteem in positive terms (Bosson et al., 2000; Greenwald and Farnham, 2000; Gawronski et al., 2007; Stieger et al., 2012) . Choosing something creates a positive association between ourselves and what is chosen. Participants in institutional design make choices which associate their positive self-evaluations to the given institution. This in turn increase support for the institution. The related literature suggests methods to elicit implicit self-evaluation. The most common method is the Initial Preference Task, which asks individuals to rate letters on a scale of likability or attractiveness (Nuttin, 1987; Greenwald and Farnham, 2000; Koole et al., 2001; Gawronski et al., 2007; Stieger et al., 2012) . The consistent nding that individuals rate letters in their names more favorable than non-name letters is taken as an indication of positive implicit self-evaluation.
Cognitive dissonance: The third possible driver is cognitive dissonance, and more specically post-decision dissonance (Festinger, 1957) : One tries to justify choices by increasing the perceived value of the chosen alternative and/or decrease the perceived value of the unchosen alternative(s) (Brehm, 1956; Morewedge and Giblin, 2015) . When making a choice, we also choose away something else, thus creating a potential cost of regret. To compensate for this discomfort, we tend to become more positive to what we have chosen (or become more negative to what we have not chosen). As this justication becomes more necessary the more equal the choice alternatives are, cognitive dissonance should be stronger the more equally valued the alternatives originally were. The theory therefore predicts that stakeholders' participation in institutional design and implementation, forces more support for the institution because stakeholders wants to justify that they made the right choice.
The following presents an experimental study aiming to test the eect of choice on institutional performance in a specic context, and to test each of the three potential psychological mechanisms described above. The assumption is that the favorable evaluation of choosing institution, relative to having the same institution imposed, increases institutional performance.
4. Experimental study 4.1. The context: REDD+ and Tanzania REDD+ (Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation, and enhancement of forest carbon stocks in developing countries) is an umbrella term for actions aimed to reduce carbon emissions from forest use in developing countries (Angelsen, 2009) . It is seen as a relatively quick and cheap approach to mitigate climate change (Stern, 2006) , with increasing attention and funds being received at the global level since its launch in 2007. More than USD 9.8 billion was pledged in aggregate between 2006 and 2014, with Norway as one of the most prominent donors (Norman and Nakhooda, 2014) .
The core idea of REDD+ is payment for environmental services (PES), i.e., forest users (countries, communities, individuals) are compensated for reduced emissions from estimated baselines (Angelsen, 2009 ). In implementing the forest conservation initiatives, however, a wide range of policies are likely to be applied, such as participatory forest management (PFM), where local communities are (to varying extents) responsible for local forest management decisions (Angelsen, 2009; Green and Lund, 2015; Scheba and Mustalahti, 2015 Tanzania has a population crucially dependent on local forest use, in particular as a source of fuel wood (World Bank, 2008; TNRF, 2009 ) and has one of the highest deforestation rates in Africa (FAO, 2011) . The country is one of the most active REDD+ countries in Africa, with the rst bilateral REDD+ agreement with Norway signed in 2008 (Blomley and Ramadhani, 2006; Blomley and Iddi, 2009; Angelsen, 2009 ). Although local REDD+ pilot projects include result-based incentives, the Tanzania-Norway agreement is not performance based and have strong elements of traditional aid cooperation (Angelsen, 2016) . Local NGOs and participatory forest management (PFM) have been key elements from the start (Blomley et al., 2011; Mwakalobo et al., 2011; URT, 2012; Sills et al., 2014; Treue et al., 2014; Scheba and Mustalahti, 2015) .
Study area and sampling
During the period September-November 2014, we conducted experiments and gathered data in three regions of Tanzania: Geita located in the tropical northwest of the country, Kilimanjaro located in the northeast and Lindi in the arid southeast of the country. In each of the three regions, we selected ve villages in collaboration with district authorities or local NGOs. The villages vary in population size, accessibility (distance to nearest major road, distance to closest town and availability of public transport), distance to forest frontier, size of the nearest accessible forest, involvement in PFM, exposure to external forest conservation project, and major livelihoods (Appendix I). The selection of regions and villages capture variation in attributes and thus make the results more generalizable.
Within each village, we randomly selected 32 participants by drawing from the village registry (an already existing list of the households in the village, but which often needed to be updated). Each participant was then randomly assigned to a specic session with a predetermined treatment. The invitation stated that they would be compensated with a small, unspecied amount of money. With 
Experimental design
We conducted a framed eld experiment (Harrison and List, 2004) : the sample (local forest users) and the framing (local forest use and conservation) are relevant. The design draws on Cardenas (2004) and Handberg and Angelsen (2015) . In each session, the eight participants are collectively endowed with a stock of 80 cardboard trees. Each tree, depicted in Figure 2 , privately pays TZS 100 (USD 0.06) to the participant who harvests it.
7 In each of nine rounds, the participant privately decides how many trees to harvest, with ve trees being the upper limit.
8 The participant has to physically tip each tree to indicate harvest, observed by an enumerator, who takes note and replants the harvested forest, such that the next participant faces the same forest size (decisions are made as if simultaneous). At the end of the harvest round, the aggregate number of trees harvested is revealed to the group and removed from 5 From precedence set by Ostrom et al. (1994, p. 108) , with the justication that it approximates some of the characteristics of larger groups or conict-ridden small groups.
6 See questionnaire in Appendix IV for a better understanding of the variables. 7 Daily wage for casual labor in rural Tanzania roughly corresponds to 15 trees. The payos are accumulated and paid at the end of the session. Participants received no show-up fee, but a minimum payment of TZS 2000 was practiced.
8 At forest stocks below 40 trees, the upper limit is determined by
, i.e., the forest stock (St) divided by the number of participants and rounded down to nearest whole number. The information is given in the form of the upper limit table given in Appendix IV. The maximum forest size is 160 trees.
the forest. Thereafter, the forest grows by two trees for every ten trees standing. The sessions lasts for nine rounds, or until the forest depletes to less than eight trees. The number of rounds and all other parameters are made known to the participants.
9
Figure 2. Tree used as token (6 cm tall)
Treatments
In a 2x3 between-groups design, the sessions were randomly selected into choice (192 participants) and no-choice (192 participants) , in addition to a control group (96 participants). Under the two treatment groups, sessions were again randomly selected into three sub-group treatments, 20%, 60% and 100% PES (see Table 2 ).
In the choice treatment, participants were asked to choose one of two additional payment schemes (in addition to the TZS 100 per tree harvested) before the rst round: (i) sell 40 of the trees immediately for TZS 50 each, implying a private payment of TZS 250 before the session starts, with an initial forest size of 40 (instead of 80) trees, or (ii) receive 20/60/100 TZS for each tree not harvested in each round, i.e., the dierence between the upper limit and the harvested amount of trees. One of the three payments (20%, 60% or 100%, measured relative to the value of a harvested tree) was presented at random (with examples for clarication), creating the three sub-treatment groups.
10 As the payments are incentives for decreasing forest use, scheme (ii) simulates a payment for environmental services (PES) scheme, and is presented as such. The participants were given three minutes to discuss privately within the group, before an anonymous referendum was held. The scheme was then chosen by majority vote.
In the no-choice treatment, participants had scheme (ii) imposed exogenously (with one of the three payment levels). These participants were also allowed to communicate in private as a group for three minutes before the rst harvest round, to control for communication eect.
In the control group, the participants experienced no PES scheme. Also this group was allowed to communicate in private for 3 minutes before the rst round. Besides sense of ownership, Table 1 presents four other potential mechanisms through which participation can improve institutional performance. The presented experimental design controls for these potential confounding eects. First, local knowledge cannot be used to select the treatment best suited to the group, as all sessions chose the superior scheme (ii). This lack of selection also ensures that choice has no impact on payos. Second, participants in the choice treatment are not given any information or benets which would empower them more than others. Third, there are no additional transparency under the choice treatment than in others. Fourth, participants in the choice and no-choice treatment groups and the control group are all allowed to communicate in private for three minutes once, thus creating the same conditions for dialogue.
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9 See Appendix IV for participant instructions. 10 For instance, harvesting three trees with an upper limit of ve trees and 60% PES implies a private earning of:
T ZS 100 * 3 + T ZS 60 * (5 − 3) = T ZS 420 in the given round.
11 Another possible counterfactual is the decoy eect. The literature on irrelevant alternatives is dominated by the idea of asymmetrical dominance (e.g., Huber et al., 1982; Ariely and Wallsten, 1995) , where there is an eect on choice of an irrelevant alternative. The eect is, however, found in choice settings where introducing an irrelevant alternativedominated by one option, but not necessarily dominated by others -increases the propensity to choose the option which dominates the irrelevant option. The design in this paper is dierent as there are only two and rather dierent options.
As presented in Section 3, the treatment relies on the assumption that choosing is an integral part of participation and that it is the choice that creates sense of ownership. The treatment also relies on the assumption that the participants perceive it as an actual choice, which will be discussed in Section 6.
Theoretical predictions
As in the design of Handberg and Angelsen (2015) , the social dilemma is whether to maximize own payos by harvesting the maximum amount of trees each round, or maximize the total payos for the group by harvesting fewer trees.
Under both 0% and at the 20% PES, the optimal decision for a payo maximizing participant is to harvest the maximum number trees which are allowed in each round, independent of the choices of the other participants in the session (the Nash equilibrium). Under 60% PES, the optimal decision depends on the beliefs the participant has about the decisions of the other participants in the same session. If a participant believes the others to be either selsh (harvest close to the maximum) or strongly pro-social (harvest close to nothing), the optimal decision is to harvest the maximum amount of trees allowed in each round. If the participant believes that the mean decision of the others is close to neither corner, the optimal decision is to harvest less. Under 100% PES, there is no incentive to harvest any trees, independent of the choices of others.
Choosing PES scheme or having the same scheme imposed should not aect the harvest decision of the participants, as the parameters are identical. The sense of ownership hypothesis, however, suggest that participants who choose the PES scheme are more positive to the intention of the scheme and should thus harvest less (increase eectiveness). Theory and earlier studies suggest that the payment schemes will perform better when chosen than when imposed, i.e., participants harvest less under choice than under no-choice. The sense of ownership hypothesis in this experimental setting is:
H1 Participants harvest more trees under no-choice than under choice
Biased information processing predicts that participants who choose the PES scheme, evaluate PES more favorable than others, which makes the PES scheme more eective among participants in the choice group. In the post-experiment interview, we indirectly asked the participants about their perceptions of the PES concept (questions 24-26, Appendix IV). On a scale from 1 to 5, where 5 is strongly agree and 1 is strongly disagree they responded to the following statements: it is right that those who benet from the clean air that our forests produce, contribute to conserving the forest (normative evaluation), it is not proven that paying for living trees decreases deforestation (factual evaluation), paying for living trees makes other forest use considerations less important; like tradition, culture and religion (PES and crowding-out). The hypothesis is: H2 Choice induces more positive participant evaluations of PES schemes and the treatment eect is stronger among these participants Associative self-anchoring predicts that the positive eect is stronger the more positive the participant evaluates themselves. In the post-experiment questionnaire, participants were asked about their rst, intuitive reaction to four letters, which they rated on a scale from one to ve (strongly dislike, dislike, ambivalent, like, strongly like) (question 32, Appendix IV). Participants were (orally) presented with the letters E and R, then the rst letter in their stated rst name and one letter not in their stated names.
The theory predicts that the participants on average rate the letter in their rst name more favorable than the letter not in their name. Similarly, participants with names which includes E and/or R, should on average rate the letter(s) more favorable than participants whose name does not include the letter(s).
The theory predicts that participants who rate letters in their own name highly (in absolute terms or relative to the rating of other letters), should have a stronger sense of ownership. The treatment eect should thus be stronger among the positive implicit self-evaluators, implying the following hypothesis:
H3 The eect of choice is stronger among participants who score higher on implicit self-evaluation Cognitive dissonance predicts that the positive eect is stronger the more equal the options are, as the potential for cognitive dissonance is stronger here. This implies that the treatment eect of choice is stronger the lower the PES level is. The specic hypothesis is: H4 The eect of choice is stronger among participants under 20% PES than under 60% and 100% PES Also, if relevant, asymmetrical dominance should strengthen the eect of the treatment. As will be revealed, the treatment eect is weak.
A plausible outcome measure for a forest conservation intervention is decrease in extractive forest use.
The following will therefore consider reduction in number of harvested trees as the measure of success of the payment scheme. As the upper limit is relative to the forest size, analyses at absolute numbers could create biases. A harvest rate [0-1] indicating the number of harvested trees relative to the upper limit is therefore used. 12 5. Results 13 5.1. Sense of ownership Table 3 summarizes the individual mean harvest rates for the aggregated treatment and control groups. Here and in the following tables, the 17 participants voting for scheme (i) are excluded. Even without treatment, the mean harvest rate is lower than the Nash equilibrium (0.57 < 1). 
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Biased information processing
The biased information processing hypothesis predicts that participants who chose the PES scheme should evaluate PES more favorable than participants who had the scheme imposed. The three elicited PES evaluations -normative evaluation, factual evaluation, and PES and crowding-out -ranks PES perception from 1 to 5 (questions 24-26, Appendix IV). Table 4 summarizes the evaluations separately by the choice treatment. It reveals that there are no signicant dierences between the group's mean evaluation in neither of the three statement. There is therefore no support for the rst requirement of H2, and the hypothesis is rejected. 12 For instance, harvesting two trees from a forest of 39 trees (upper limit of four) and harvesting one tree from a forest of 17 trees (upper limit of two) implies the same harvest rate: 0.5.
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The following tests multiple hypotheses, which could lead to type I errors if not corrected for. As will be apparent, there are no (false) positives and thus no need for corrections.
14 The observations are removed as sense of ownership, according to the three presented theories, should only arise for those who choose the scheme that is implemented. For impact assessment purposes, it could be interesting to analyze the eect in aggregate; stakeholders likely vote dierently. Appendix III show that although nay-sayers harvest signicantly more, including them produces similar results and the same conclusions.
15 The harvesting is still unsustainable, as the forest stock decreases through the nine rounds in eleven sessions (of twelve) and depletes in six of these.
16 All mean comparisons in the paper are bootstrapped (Efron and Tibshirani, 1993) t-tests, as this does not require distribution assumptions and the number of repetitions (9999) ensures reliable power (probability to reject equality of means) (Davidson and MacKinnon, 2000; Moatt, 2016) . The standard errors are clustered at the session level.
Associative self-anchoring
The associative self-anchoring hypothesis predicts that (i) the participants' mean implicit self-evaluation should be positive, and (ii) that the treatment eect is stronger for participants with positive implicit self-evaluation than for others. Table 5 presents the mean implicit self-evaluation of the participants.
The table reveals that participants evaluate the letters E and R more favorable if it is the rst letter in their stated rst name. The participants also evaluate the rst letter in their rst stated name more favorable than a letter not in their name (see Appendix II for the distribution of letters). The nding is not as clear in their evaluations of E and R when their stated names include the letters elsewhere to when their names do not include the letters; R is evaluated more favorable, but E is not. Taken together, the data supports previous ndings in that people tend to evaluate letters in their own name more favorable than other letters (e.g., Nuttin, 1987; Hoorens et al., 1990; Koole et al., 2001; Gawronski et al., 2007) , which supports prediction (i). With no signicant impact on mean harvest rates of the choice in Table 6 , neither among the positives nor among the neutrals/negatives. There is thus no support for H3.
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Cognitive dissonance
The cognitive dissonance hypothesis predicts that the treatment eect is stronger the lower the PES level is, as this implies that the two payment schemes presented to the participants are more equal.
18 Table 7 reports the mean harvest rates by the three payment levels under no choice and choice.
17 24% of the participants stated to be illiterate. Since the letters were presented orally and all participants knew their own name, I assume that literacy is not required for the association. Investigating the means by the three payment levels reveals that the participants respond to increasing the PES payment. Comparing the means within each PES level reveal no signicant impact of the choice treatment at any of the three PES levels.
Further investigating, Table 8 reports the implied harvest rate of each participant decision regressed on treatment and control variables. x it−1 is the lagged harvest rate decision and
is the lagged average harvest rate decisions of the other seven participants in the same session. Village xed eects are included to control for possible biases in that the distribution of treatments is not identical in each village, and round dummies are included to control for time trends (not reported). There is no signicant impact of choice on the harvest decisions of the participants in any of the three PES levels, thus leaving no support for H4. 
Discussion
In the presented framed eld experiment there is no signicant impact on institutional eectiveness (measured as decreased forest use) of allowing participants to choose a PES scheme relative to imposing the same scheme. Examining the data by three theories explaining the possible eect -biased information processing, associative self-anchoring and cognitive dissonance -nds little impact of the choice treatment. There are at least three possible explanations for the results. The following subsections discuss each.
No signicant sense of ownership in this context
One explanation is that the sense of ownership hypothesis does not apply in the context of incentive based forest conservation among local forest users in Tanzania. The lack of a signicant result could simply be due to the eect not being present. The sense of ownership hypothesis might underestimate the rationality of Tanzanian forest users; they support good policies and oppose what are considered bad policies, independent of the source of origin or design.
The specic context of the empirical test is important. Tanzania has a history of decentralized forest management, also at the village level (Blomley and Ramadhani, 2006; Lund and Treue, 2008 ). The sampled participants should thus be familiar with participation in the three stages of Figure 1 . Still, choices tend to be made by village leadership, such as the forest committee, not directly by the average forest user (Lund and Treue, 2008) . Unfortunately the sub-sample of village leaders is too small for clear inference.
The treatment also investigates the hypothesis in the context of incentive based forest conservation.
The PES scheme is a particular institution that leaves more freedom to the forest user than for instance a command and control institution. Previous experimental studies nd a dividend of democracy in more constraining institutions. No observed eect in this context does not necessarily imply that there is no eect under other institutional arrangements. Furthermore, although there are REDD+ pilot projects in Tanzania, the initiative is unknown to most forest users. Inability to properly relate to the chosen PES scheme in the experiment might reduce the impact of sense of ownership.
Lastly, the treatment seeks to test for participation in the design stage. The sense of ownership hypothesis could for instance apply stronger in the initiative stage than in the design stage. The hypothesis could also have stronger impact on eciency or equity than eectiveness.
Design issues
A necessity for rejecting the sense of ownership hypothesis in this context is good treatment validity,
i.e., participants' response to the treatment is predictive for real life responses of participation in designing PES schemes (Handberg and Angelsen, 2015) .
The treatment relies on the assumptions that choice is an integral part of local participation and that the potential sense of ownership works through choice. The latter assumption is supported by theories within psychology and behavioral economics, and these specic theories are tested. The former assumption is supported by scholars on participation (e.g., Arnstein, 1969; Pretty, 1995; Cornwall, 2008; Reed, 2008) who emphasize that good participation involves local stakeholders in decision-making processes.
Although the participants are presented with a choice, the choice treatment could be too weak, which may lead to a type II error. Allowing the participants to choose between two payment schemes, where one is inferior to the other, has the desirable attribute that it controls for selection eects. The cost is that the treatment presents a rather easy choice; only minor cognitive eorts are necessary to infer that one is preferred over the other. The participants can feel (rightly so) that they make no real choice.
An additional caveat is that the harvest rates are low, even under no and low PES. This naturally limits the improvement potential of the choice treatment. Still, mean harvest rates under 60% and 100%
PES are signicantly lower than the mean under 20% PES, indicating that there is some improvement potential.
Weak vs. strong participation
Related to the weak treatment caveat, sense of ownership may be dependent on the degree of real inuence the stakeholders exercise through their choice. The ranking in Figure 1 denes control as strong participation, and consent and consultation as weaker forms of participation.
The choice in the experiment is informed and free, but one option is clearly superior to the other. An obvious choice creates little potential impact by each individual choice. The choice is also constrained to the two payment schemes, indicating that the degree of participation is arguably closer to consent than control. The lack of support for the sense of ownership hypothesis could thus be due to the weak form of participation implied by the treatment. Under 20% PES, the choice should be perceived as less obvious since the options are more similar than under 60% and 100% PES. Although insignicant, a decreasing dierence in mean harvest rates by choice and a reversal of dierence would indicate an eect of choice when the options of the choice are more equal. Both cognitive dissonance (Brehm, 1956; Morewedge and Giblin, 2015) and associative self-anchoring (Gawronski et al., 2007) predict stronger eects of choosing with higher cognitive eorts.
The lack of a clear overall treatment eect (and positive ndings of others, presented in Subsection 2.2) could thus be an argument for stronger participation. Weak participation, such as participatory rhetoric without actual participation, could then be not only immoral, it could also, from a project proponent's viewpoint, be a cost with no benets. In contrast, strong participation might not only be an end in itself, but also have positive eects on institutional performance.
Participation simply as a management tool is arguably a contradiction in terms. Strong participation implies stakeholders' opportunity to change the rules of the game, without strict constraints by
proponents. Sense of ownership may require strong participation to have a real impact and improve institutional performance.
At the societal level, participation is normally either advocated as an end in itself (e.g., Sen, 1999) or as a means to achieve other ends, such as economic security (e.g., Arnstein, 1969; Sen, 1999) . For project proponents on strict budgets with specic goals, these arguments might not motivate a more participatory approach. From the proponent´s viewpoint the latter argument is a positive externality and the former is normative. Research exploring positive eects of local participation on institutional performance (such as the sense of ownership hypothesis) can help incentivize proponents to move higher up on the participation rankings in designing and implementing institutions, and to facilitate more local initiatives.
Conclusion
Participation of local stakeholders in initiating, designing or implementing institutions is often claimed by scholars and practitioners to improve institutional eectiveness, eciency or equity, through at least ve possible mechanisms. Sense of ownership, as one of these mechanisms, is often advocated within the development and nature conservation communities. Theoretical and empirical justications remain scarce. Possible theoretical support is found within psychology and behavioral economics, and a few lab experiments on the eects of democracy give empirical support.
The presented experimental study tests the eect of participation in the design stage on institutional eectiveness, through the sense of ownership hypothesis. The results lend no support to the hypothesis in the context of incentive based forest conservation among local Tanzanian forest users.
One possible explanation for the lack of support is that the experiment represents a weak form of par-
ticipation. An implication is that weak participation is not only problematic when viewing participation as an end, but also as a means to improve institutional performance. The nding questions the view that a The participant states to use less (1), about the same (2) or more (3) forest products than other households in the village.
b The participants regards the forest to be non-important (1), important (2) or essential (3) for the household. c The participants has experienced no (0), manageable (1) or severe (2) income shortfall/unexpectedly large expenditure in the past 12 months.
d Most of the participant's roof consists of thatch (1), wood (2) or tin (3).
Appendix II: Letter evaluations Appendix III: Including nay-sayers Table AIII .1 reveals that participants who voted for the other payment scheme (nay-sayers, N =17) have a higher individual mean harvest rates than participants who voted for the PES scheme (yea-sayers, N =175) (bootstrapped t-test with 9999 repetitions and standard errors clustered at the session level). This could be because of spiteful behavior arising from losing the referendum, or because of unobservables that determine both voting and harvesting behaviors. Attempts to predict the probability to vote for the PES scheme by observables from the questionnaire produce no signicant determinants. The following tables report the tests performed in Tables 3-4 and 6-8 with all participants.
Including the nay-sayers in the tests does not change the ndings. 
Appendix IV: Experiment materials in English Instructions
Thank you everyone for accepting this invitation. We will spend almost three hours explaining the activity, playing and conducting a short survey at the end. Let's start! The following exercise is a different and entertaining way to actively participate in a project about forests. Besides participating in this exercise and earning money, you will answer a few questions afterwards. The funds to cover the expenses have been donated by a scientific body. The reason why we use money and paper trees is to create situations as similar to your real life situations as possible
The situation is one where a group, you, must make decisions about the use of a forest. You have been selected and asked to participate in a random draw from a list of all families in this village. This is done to make sure that all have the same chance of participating.
This exercise is different than exercises in which other persons in this community or others may have played already. Therefore, comments you have heard from other persons do not necessarily apply to this exercise.
Please pay a lot of attention to the instructions. If you understand the instructions, you will be able to make better decisions in the exercise. Please, remain seated and do not speak with other participants. If you have a question, raise your hand and we will answer your question.
So to the experiment, let's pretend this group has a forest of initially these 80 trees [point to the paper trees]. For 9 rounds, equivalent to for example years or wood harvest seasons, each of you will enter the forest and decide how many trees to harvest. You will each earn 100 shillings for each tree you decide to harvest. Think of this as equivalent to firewood, charcoal, timber etc. You can harvest a minimum of 0 trees from the forest and a maximum given by this After all of you have privately and anonymously harvested trees in one round, you are all gathered here and the total number of removed trees in that round is announced.
Then the forest grows: for every 10 standing trees, 2 trees are added. [Show how trees are added]
[If in treatment group 1-3:] You will get an additional payment of your choice. There will be a referendum to ensure that you get the payment you want. You will get 3 minutes to discuss together. Then you will vote in in private on which payment you want. You can choose between:
-Sell half of your trees. The 40 trees are valued at 2000 shillings, meaning you will be earn 250 shillings before the exercise starts. The forest is then decreased to 40 trees. 
